The West: from enemy to savior?
The international
normalization of Vietnam’s status took another giant step forward that same
month of July of 1995, when the U.S. established diplomatic relations with its
former enemy. A Bilateral Trade
Agreement (BTA) between the two nations entered into force in 2001, and Vietnam
was granted unconditional normal trade relations status by the U.S. in 2006.
Since then, bilateral trade between the United States and Vietnam has increased
exponentially, reaching $15.4 billion in 2009 (U.S. Department of State, 2010).
The U.S. is Vietnam's second-largest trade partner overall, just after China.
In October
2008, the U.S. and Vietnam inaugurated annual political-military talks and
policy planning talks to consult on regional security and strategic issues. Meanwhile,
President George W. Bush openly vowed to support Vietnam’s sovereignty,
security and territorial integrity (Dosch, 2009), in what was a premonition of
the 2010 events. First, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates affirmed that the U.S.
wanted to ensure stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered
economic development in the South China Sea. Then came Hillary Clinton’s words,
assuring that the peaceful resolution of competing sovereignty claims to the
South China Sea was a U.S. national interest, prompting Chinese Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi to claim her comments were an attack on China. Just a month later,
the U.S. Department of Defense and Vietnam’s Ministry of Defense held the first
round of annual high-level defense talks, which preceded a joint naval
exercise. In other words, ASEAN’s and Vietnam’s friendship and relationship
with the U.S. is clearly going further away from being just on economic/trade
matters.
Meanwhile, Vietnam’s diplomatic relations with the European
Communities were established in 1990. The first EU-Vietnam Framework
Cooperation Agreement (FCA) was signed in 1995, entering into force in June
1996
and aiming to promote trade and investment, support Vietnam's economic
development and its transition to a market economy. Moreover, Vietnam, as a
developing country, is a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences,
which offers preferential access to the European market in the form of reduced
tariffs for goods.
With the EU-Vietnam agenda diversifying towards
increased political and economic cooperation, negotiations to create a Free
Trade Area
(FTA) and to sign a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) were
launched in 2007. Eight rounds have already been completed with notable
progress achieved, but the final signature of the Agreement is being delayed
due to severe discrepancies in the fields of human rights and the rule of law
between the two parties[3].
Overall, therefore, Vietnam has powerful economic and
military partners to compensate for the meteoric rise of the traditional regional
power, who is now once again taking the stage of world affairs.
China: the budding regional hegemon
There are two main,
contradictory approaches to Chinese foreign policy, not only towards Southeast
Asia but regarding its general orientation and goals. Both are based on Deng
Xiaoping’s words, tao guang yang hui,
whose different interpretations lead to two opposing views. The first one,
promoted by Beijing and Chinese scholars and commentators, and which translates
it as just keeping a low profile in international affairs, depicts China as a
benevolent global player, centered on its three main priorities – sovereignty,
security and development (Wang, 2011).
The other, mainly
voiced by American realist scholars – most notably John Mearsheimer but also,
in a more nuanced fashion, by Elizabeth Economy or Joseph Nye –, portraits
China as an actor that hides its strengths and willingly portraits its
weaknesses to avoid cooperating in global affairs while accumulating power to,
in due time, change the actual world system.
Southeast Asia’s view
of Chinese foreign policy falls somewhere in between these two opposed
approaches. While some scholars challenge the hypothesis that China, as a
rising economic power, seeks political gains leveraging the trade asymmetry
with smaller partners Asian, arguing that China’s bilateral economic
cooperation with individual ASEAN members – such as Vietnam – is for the
pursuit of (mutual) prosperity (Ko, 2010). However, even those same scholars
are cautious when predicting future developments.
Border
disputes, wars, mistrust emanating from China’s imperial past: economic
relations aside, those have been the constants of the relations between Vietnam
and China. Close ties between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. prompted China to sever
ties with its southern neighbour, even briefly entering into war with Vietnam
in 1978 as retaliation for Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia that toppled the
pro-Chinese khmer rouge government.
Although
land border disputes were solved in 1999 and the controversy surrounding the
area of the Gulf
of Tonkin was also settled one year later,
just a few years after relations between the two countries were normalized (in
1991), overlapping claims over the Spratly and the Paracel islands in the potentially oil-rich area of the
South China Sea – or the East Sea, as Vietnam calls it –, remain a hot issue.
Over the years, such claims have
produced armed altercations; in 1988, 70 Vietnamese sailors died in a confrontation
with China in the Spratlys. The new century seemed to bring some progress, with
the 2002 declaration setting freedom of navigation and the 2005 agreements on security
cooperation and to perform joint seismic surveys. However, already in 2005, a
Chinese gunboat opened fire on Vietnamese fishermen, killing 9. The year 2007 marked a low point in China-Vietnam
relations, after
China pressured foreign oil companies to abandon their exploration contracts
with Vietnam in the South China Sea and Hanoi subsequently tolerated anti-Chinese
demonstrations (Dosch, 2008).
Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership
announced in 2008, relations with China remained tense, as exemplified by the
brief diplomatic crisis caused by a Chinese website that posted documents of
alleged invasion plans of Vietnam. China's efforts in the summer of 2009 to strictly
enforce its unilateral fishing ban in disputed waters led to the detention of
more than two dozen Vietnamese fishermen (U.S. Department of State, 2010).
Fears of Chinese
naval power growth and, linked to that,
of the assertiveness of Beijing’s policy towards the South China Sea were
confirmed in 2010, when Admiral Zhang Huachen affirmed that the Chinese navy
was aiming for far sea defense to protect major shipping lanes, and that the
South China Sea would be the first battleground (Economy, 2011). Rhetoric is
sustained by hard facts: China is building a big naval base in Hainan Island,
just in front of the coast of Vietnam.
Added to the disputes and historical animosity are
also fears, common in all Southeast Asian countries, that China will influence
internal politics via its Diaspora (Chung, 2004). Be it true or not, what can’t be denied is that
China's internal dynamism creates external ambitions: empires rarely come about
by design; they grow organically (Kaplan, 2010), and peripheral states have to
contain their overwhelming power with the limited means they have in hand.
Hedging against China’s rise
There is also some debate on the position of Southeast Asian countries,
including Vietnam, vis-à-vis China’s rise. On the one side, scholars such as Steve
Chan (2008) suggest that China’s strategy of "peaceful
development" means that countries in East Asia are, in general, not alarmed by
a rising China, a view that is supported by David C. Kang (2007),
who argues that China’s rapidly growing economic, military and political power
has not led to a balancing behavior by other states in the region, as it has
already occurred in other historical periods: in other words, China’s ascent
has meant increased regional stability.
However, many
scholars dismiss these arguments, based on the simple premise that past events
cannot be reliably used to predict future behaviors. Moreover, the Chinese
empire was a self-contained, economically and socially conservative entity
which did not actively seek the improvement of its material and power
conditions via continuous economic interactions with other countries. Current
China is much different: it’s an economic powerhouse, hungry for markets,
energy resources, raw materials and markets willing to absorb their products,
and that makes it obviously more aggressive in the practical endeavors of its
foreign policy.
An overall
analysis of the behaviors of most East Asian countries towards China, however,
shows a tendency to moderate, low-key hedging combined with overt, mostly
economic engagement (Roy, 2005), with only Taiwan[9] – for obvious reasons – pursuing a relatively unambiguous balancing
strategy toward China and just North Korea clearly bandwagoning with China[10].
In fact, the
range of policy choices for smaller states facing a potential regional hegemon
is broader than balancing and bandwagoning (Schweller, 1999). Southeast Asian
states employ four strategies, the most general being hedging, or keeping open
more than one strategic option against the possibility of a future security
threat (Roy, 2005). However, they also engage with the up-and-coming regional
big power, using rewards in exchange for its acceptance of the existing status
quo. These two moderate strategies lie in the middle of the intensity spectrum,
which is coped by (power) balancing on the non-cooperation side, and by
bandwagoning as the extreme form of cooperation with the perceived hegemon.
Of course,
scholars such as Chung (2004) also detect a strategy of “counter-hedging”
emanating from Beijing policy, focused on reaching out to Southeast Asian
countries and making them come to terms with China’s leadership. As such, China
also expect deference from Southeast Asian nations in respect to foreign
policy.
As
far as Vietnam is concerned, scholars writing in different moments of recent
history attest how a sense of resentment towards China remains both within much
of Vietnam’s political elite and in part of the population (Pierre, 2000 and Dosch, 2009).
Although scholars writing a few years ago claimed that Vietnam practiced one of
the most moderate, covert ways of hedging against Chinese power (Roy, 2005),
things seemed to change in recent years, as demonstrated by the recent
strategic rapprochement with the U.S.
Several authors also identify one more reason for
Vietnam to hedge against Chinese growing influence: namely, that Vietnamese
economy is largely competitive, rather than complimentary, to China’s (Roy,
2005). However, other scholars, such as Chung (2004), consider that China can
be also an excellent market for, among others, Vietnamese household and
electronic appliances. In any case, it seems clear that the goal pursued by
Hanoi in the transition period until the ASEAN-China FTA takes full effect is
to see labor costs rise in China and, therefore, indirectly make Vietnam’s
manufactures more competitive.
Conclusions and recommendations: multipolar crosshedging
From the above it can
easily be inferred that neither bandwagoning nor openly balancing against China
is the way to go for Vietnam. Instead, a more refined version of the current
low-key hedging seems to offer the best chances for an independent, sovereign
and prosperous Vietnam.
Therefore, the aim should be to create a
strategy based upon a detailed division of the interrelating hedging activities
and policies, both at the internal and the external level: in other words, to
build a structure of multipolar crosshedging. Internally, hedging can both take
place at the economic and the military/security levels. Externally, these same
categories apply, but should be further divided in multilateral and bilateral
activities/policies.
Starting with the internal hedging, one
key goal for Vietnam’s policymakers should be improving the political and
economic conditions. Improved rule of law and a serious drive to curb rampant
corruption would create a far better climate to attract foreign investment that
currently goes further north, into China or elsewhere in Asia. Moreover, the
progressive aperture of the economy should be gradually accelerated, as well as
the dismantling of old, inefficient SOEs that still account for a large share
of the nation’s GDP and which squeeze Vietnam’s public finances. Finally, the
government should keep fighting against high inflationary pressures,
exacerbated by the growing inflow of imports and the continuous depreciation of
Vietnam’s currency – which seemed to halt in 2010, but is accelerating again in
2011 –, the dong, due to the rising public debt. Again, dismantling big SOEs in
a controlled fashion – instead of pumping billions into moribund ones – could
help break these negative dynamics.
The second side of internal hedging is
already being actively pursued by the Vietnamese government. With the goal of
building a credible deterrent, able to alter the calculations of a
hypothetically aggressive China, Vietnam is on a drive to acquire modern
Russian, French and Indian weapons. This
buildup, although the risks any arms race entails, should be considered
necessary as long as China claims its undisputed sovereignty over the South
China Sea.
On the international plane, Vietnam
should strive to improve its hedging against Chinese hegemony on two fields
(economic/political and military/security), as well as using two engagement and
cooperation methods: bilateralism and multilateralism. Thus, the bilateral
economic hedging strategy should be highlighted by the push to sign a new
Association Agreement with the European Union and, given the difficulties posed
by the multilateral ASEAN-U.S. negotiations, also a bilateral Free Trade Area
agreement with the U.S.
The key to understand this approach is
based on the nature and structure of the relevant economies: namely, Vietnam’s
export-oriented economy – whose main exports, accounting for almost 70% of GDP,
are oil, textiles, footwear, fishery and
seafood products, rice,
pepper, wood products, coffee and rubber – is fully compatible with the more
advanced, postmodern economies of the U.S. and the EU.
Broadening the trade channels with these
two major economic powers, who already are Vietnam’s two main export partners and
with whom Vietnam enjoys a healthy trade surplus (European Commission, 2011,
and U.S. Department of State, 2010), via the implementation of such agreements
would boost Vietnam’s exports – as it proved to do when normal trade relations
with both the EU and the U.S. were established – and also reduce Vietnam’s
economic dependence on China, with whom Vietnam became further enmeshed after
the entry into force of the ASEAN-China FTA in 2010.
Criticism to this approach will
certainly include claims that expensive imports from these countries are going
to skyrocket and, therefore, hurt the already worrying trade balance figures.
However, such claims are unfounded: imports would keep on rising anyway, as in
any country with a fast-growing economy aiming for middle-income status.
Moreover, FTAs would only help reduce the prices end consumers and companies
pay for such foreign goods – which they would end up buying anyway –, thus even
helping to curb mounting inflation.
The multilateral side to economic hedging will
hang upon successful full inclusion into the ASEAN Free Trade Area – Vietnam
was given extra time to
meet the AFTA's tariff reduction obligations – as well as into the ASEAN Comprehensive
Investment Area, both due by 2015. In the meantime, Vietnam should also push
for the effective application of the tariff reduction for rice exports to
China, due in 2015,
as well as for further tariff reductions this valuable Vietnamese export. Another
obvious goal would be the effective hedging against cheap, cost-effective
Chinese manufactures, which will be able to freely enter the Vietnamese market
in 2015, via the internal hedging measures proposed above.
Moving on to the security area, multilateral
hedging activities should be centered on the resolution, either within the
ASEAN framework or by accepting the mediation proposal made by U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton in 2010, of sovereignty disputes over the Spratly
Islands with the Philippines and Malaysia. Reaching an agreement is, more than
ever, a priority, even if it involves some form of joint sovereignty or
tit-for-tat agreements regarding the exploration and exploitation of energy
sources and the fishing rights over these territories. The goal should be to
confront China with one united voice, which would also help Vietnam’s case
regarding sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. Vietnam should then push for these
conflicts to be discussed and resolved within the ARF framework.
The ASEAN Regional Forum should also, in its
turn, take a leap forward to become a tool of constructive diplomacy, and not
just a multilateral forum for confidence-building. Going to the next stage will
require strong political will by a community of members that sustain the
inviolability of the principle of non-interference into internal affairs.
However, Vietnam should side with the U.S., a strong proponent of a more
integral approach to the forum (Nanto, 2010), to emphasize the need for moving
forward in this sense.
A more active and assertive ARF, together with
a united stand by all ASEAN countries, should also be the best framework from
which to push for the establishment of a binding Code of Conduct on the South
China Sea, containing specific terms that would counter China’s hegemonic
interests in the area. Although the 1992 Declaration was a step in the good
direction, facts and recent history tell us that it was insufficient: a new,
stronger agreement is sorely needed, and Vietnam will only be able to contain
Chinese ambitions via stronger cooperation with both the U.S. and its regional
partners.
Finally, bilateral hedging in security matters
would involve the further deepening of military relations with the U.S.,
building upon the progresses made in recent years. Military cooperation with a
quickly modernizing and militarily stronger India, which is also hedging
against China’s regional dominance, should also be pursued: there is already a
successful precedent, when Indian naval vessels exercised with their Vietnamese
counterparts in the South China Sea in mid-2000 (Chung, 2004). Finally, the
good relations with Russia could be extended to some form of military
cooperation, be it on a bilateral basis or under the ASEAN umbrella.
However, the all these multilateral hedging
efforts will be useless or counterproductive if Vietnam alienates China. In
fact, Hanoi should seek further engagement and cooperation with China, based on
shared interests and values. Bilateral talks regarding the status of the South
China Sea should be maintained, in order to keep all negotiation channels open,
and emphasis should be put on the ability of both nations to achieve peaceful
resolutions to thorny matters, as was the case with the 1999 and 2000 border
demarcation agreements.
Also in political terms, ASEAN +3 should also
be seen as an effective channel for political dialogue and cooperation, as well
as for boosting mutual trust and resolving disputes (Simon, 2008). Vietnam
should strive to further boost this dialogue channel
Moreover, cooperation on transnational issues
such as human and drug trafficking should be further improved, both in the best
interest of Vietnam (affected by the trafficking of young Vietnamese women sent
to China to marry local peasants or to work as prostitutes) and China
(seriously affected by increasing drug smuggling to Yunnan province, mainly
from Myanmar but also from Vietnam).
Pollution and overconsumption of upstream water
resources of the Mekong River are also an issue that should be raised. The
effects this has downstream, on Vietnam’s rice paddies in the Mekong Delta, can
also hurt Beijing’s quest for food security, as China is a big customer of
Vietnamese rice exports. Therefore, Hanoi has a clear bargaining chip, offering preferential treatment to China in rice exports in exchange for environmentally-sound exploitation of hydraulic resources in the Mekong River.
Finally, although the Vietnamese government should aim to improve its human rights track record, if the current status quo in that aspect is maintained, Vietnam will enjoy staunch support from China, which also deems Western criticism as illicit, obtrusive and provocative interference in domestic affairs.
Maintaining the best possible balance has been the cornerstone of Vietnamese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War (Dosch, 2009), while the preservation of state sovereignty, foreign policy autonomy, regional peace and economic growth have been ASEAN’s goals since its inception in 1967 (Roy, 2005 and Simon, 2008). Hanoi, as the other governments in the wider region, is very careful not to provoke China, except when protecting vital national interests (Roy, 2005). With their careful strategy of moderate hedging and enhanced cooperation, Vietnamese authorities look to avoid turning China into an enemy by treating it as an enemy. However, China will have to convince its neighbors that it takes their concerns into consideration as it builds up its military capabilities, while also aiming for greater transparency and willingness to establish common security systems in the wider region (Wang, 2011). Until that happens, smaller Asian nations such as Vietnam will have to keep on hedging to maintain this unstable balance or power, peace and prosperity.
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However, some scholars writing at the start of the
current century, such as Kang saw a pattern of bandwagoning with China (Roy,
2005). However, his view of bandwagoning focuses on economic cooperation and
interdependence, based on Schweller’s (1994) definition, and not on Waltz’s
(1987) more integral approach, that also includes a security component. As
Acharya (2003) affirms, economic cooperation does not mean political alignment
with China.